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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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The acquisition of public sector complex systems is time consuming, very expensive, 
and rife with uncertainties.  The enterprise associated with acquisition is an excellent candidate 
for transformation—fundamental change to achieve substantially higher levels of value.  This 
paper argues that choosing among alternative transformation initiatives should be based on an 
enterprise-wide perspective as well as an economic valuation of the alternative investments.  An 
options-based methodology for assessing economic value is presented and illustrated. 
Introduction 
Enterprises that acquire public sector complex systems are facing serious cost 
challenges.  Costs of military platforms (e.g., ships), space platforms (e.g., space stations) and 
transportation systems (e.g., airports) have increased enormously in the past few decades, far 
beyond inflation during this period.  Consequently, the public sector enterprises that acquire 
these systems anticipate buying fewer systems.  This tends to sacrifice needed capabilities as 
well as exacerbate the cost challenges. 
This paper addresses the question of where resources should be invested to transform 
the overall acquisition enterprise and ameliorate this problem.  The model of the enterprise 
adopted includes political entities (e.g., Congress), government agencies (e.g., the military 
services), contracting companies (e.g., defense contractors), workforce organizations (e.g., 
unions), development and construction facilities (e.g., ship yards), and suppliers to facilities.  
This model is illustrated in the context of military shipbuilding. 
A portfolio management approach is outlined that enables understanding and balancing 
the returns and risks associated with alternative investments, as well as highlighting 
investments that dominate alternatives in terms of both returns and risks.  Investments 
considered include rationalizing of authorization and acquisition processes, streamlining of 
acquisition policies and practices, accelerating bid and proposal processes, modifying work 
processes and procedures, redesigning incentives and reward systems and, of course, 








To an extent, we are addressing the question of the economic value of reforming 
acquisition.  To place our approach in context, it is valuable to understand the effects of 
previous reform efforts and the current state of research on the acquisition enterprise itself.  Our 
emphasis in this section is on defense acquisition. 
Acquisition Reform  
The defense acquisition enterprise is unique; it operates with public funds, with primarily 
one buyer, little competition, contracts signed years in advance based on cost estimates, and 
decisions made in complex stages by multiple organizations.  The process is infused with 
disparate goals and objectives: to have the highest performing technology at the lowest price 
possible in the fastest amount of time; to ensure the defense industry and related economies 
remain solvent; and to encourage small business, minority contractors, and women-owned 
businesses (Cancian, 1995).  The number of participants in the acquisition enterprise is large, 
and each has different goals and measures of success.  It seems that we cannot agree on what 
needs to be reformed—let alone how to fix it. 
Historically, reforms have been enacted for primarily two reasons: increasing complexity 
of the technologies involved and individual corruption and abuse for monetary gain.  Excesses 
in time and cost, or deficits in performance, are some of the more obvious outward signs that 
reform is warranted. It took 25 years from the time the Air Force identified the need for an 
advanced tactical fighter to replace the F-15 until the F-22 was combat-ready.  During that time, 
defense spending cuts caused several major re-phasings of the program, adding to the delay. 
The M247 Sergeant York DIVAD (Division Air Defense gun) was born of the Army's 
need for a replacement for the ageing M163 20mm Vulcan A/A gun and M48 Chaparral missile 
system.  When the first production vehicles were delivered in late 1983, there were many 
performance deficits, most notably the radar’s inability to distinguish between a hovering 
helicopter and a clump of trees. This problem and others proved insurmountable and, in 
December 1986 (after about 50 vehicles had been produced), the entire program was 
terminated.  
The list of acquisition regulations and initiatives is fairly lengthy but, as shown by 
Drezner et al. (1993), reform initiatives from 1960 to 1990 did not reduce cost growth on 197 
defense programs.  In fact, the average cost growth on these programs was 20% and did not 
change significantly for 30 years.  Christensen et al. (1999) reaffirmed this conclusion and also 
found that initiatives based on the specific recommendations of the Packard Commission did not 
reduce the average cost overrun percent experienced on 269 completed defense acquisition 
contracts evaluated over an 8-year period (1988-1995).  Actually, cost performance experienced 
on development contracts and on contracts managed by the Air Force worsened significantly.  
These findings raise the question of whether it is possible to transform the acquisition 
enterprise, and to have the varied stakeholders agree to any extent that the process has 









A quick review of recent acquisition research topics indicates a tendency to concentrate 
on single-issue concepts such as outsourcing, contractors, leasing, privatization, contingency 
contracting, performance measurement and financial management.  Considering the 2004 and 
2005 Annual Conferences on Acquisition Research, topics covered included: 
• Acquisition avenues such as market-based acquisition, capabilities-based acquisition, 
competitive sourcing, and outsourcing 
• Acquisition issues such as program management, performance management, and business 
process reengineering 
• Financially oriented topics such as financial management, total cost of ownership, and real-
option models 
Further, acquisition policy in general was, of course, a recurring theme.  While improving 
the performance and/or judging the effectiveness of each of these topics is worthwhile, it is also 
important to study the overall acquisition enterprise as an integrated and interactive complex 
system.   
Currently, however, only extremely limited acquisition research is being conducted—
primarily by internal DoD organizations, such as the Naval Postgraduate School, Defense 
Acquisition University, Air Force Institute of Technology, and DoD FFRDC’s (e.g., RAND and 
LMI).  Although these research projects offer valuable assessments of current practices and 
suggestions for improvements, the results are often limited in scope and may only address one 
specific problem at a time, often replicate previous or parallel work, and generally have limited 
general application.  These efforts constitute only a fraction of the effort that is warranted by the 
size, complexity, and changing nature of DoD’s acquisition challenges.  They are not a 
substitute for disciplined, replicable academic research (Gansler, 2005). 
Acquisition Lifecycle 
Figure 1 depicts the Defense Acquisition Management Framework provided in the 
Defense Directive 5000.1 (DoD, 2003).  This process provides both the context for 
transformation of acquisition and an opportunity, in itself, for transformation.  In fact, the ways in 
which the many stakeholders in the acquisition enterprise exercise this process strongly affect 
the time, costs, and uncertainties associated with the acquisition of complex systems.  In light of 
the Secretary of Defense’s stated transformation priorities, this process would seem to be a 
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THE ACQUISITION ENTERPRISE 
Consider the enterprise of military shipbuilding.  This enterprise is facing serious cost 
challenges.  Shipbuilding costs have increased enormously in the past three decades, far 
beyond inflation during this period.  Consequently, customers for these ships anticipate buying 
fewer ships, which tends to exacerbate the cost challenges.  This paper addresses the question 
of where resources should be invested to transform the enterprises such as shipbuilding and 
ameliorate these problems. 
Enterprise Issues 
As indicated in Figure 2, the enterprise of interest includes a set of stakeholders and 
issues much broader than those directly associated with the ships of interest.  Congress, the 
services, defense contractors and workforce organizations have significant impact on the 
returns and risks associated with alternative investments.  These stakeholders affect the ship 
building enterprise in a variety of ways: 
• Congressional Interests & Mandates, e.g., Jobs & Other Economic Interests 
• Service Interests & Oversights, e.g., Procedures, Documentation & Meetings 
• Incentives & Rewards for Contractors, e.g., Cost-Plus vs. Firm Fixed-price 
• Lack of Market-Based Competition, e.g., Hiring & Retention Problems 












Figure 2. The Overall Shipbuilding Enterprise 
 
Military vs. Commercial Ships 
There have, in recent years, been many studies of best commercial practices in 
manufacturing and assembly, e.g., Lean and Six Sigma, and attempts to adopt these practices 
for military shipbuilding.  These initiatives have had positive impacts.  However, there are 
important differences between military and commercial ships: 
• Ship Size & Complexity—Slower Design 
 Commercial: Large & Relatively Simple 
 Military: Complex & Relatively Small 
• Acquisition Process—Slower Buying 
 Commercial Simpler than Congressional/Military 
• Design & Construction—Slower Production 
 Commercial: Large Steel Boxes with Simple Systems 
 Military: High Density of Integrated, Sophisticated Equipment 
• Workforce Character—More Expensive People 




= - 118 - 
=
=
 Military: Much More Engineering Support 
Consequently, commercial shipbuilding “best practices” are, in many respects, inapplicable to 
military shipbuilding, especially for naval combatant vessels.  This is not to deny that some 
subset of commercial “best practices” can be transferred to military shipbuilding, but these are 
unlikely to dramatically reduce military shipbuilding costs. 
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
We advocate a portfolio management approach to enable understanding and balancing 
the returns and risks associated with alternative investments, as well as highlighting 
investments that dominate alternatives in terms of both returns and risks.  Figure 3 depicts a 
typical portfolio for a military weapon system. 
 
Figure 3. Example Portfolio Plot for Military Weapon System 
Alternative investments, denoted by the Ps, are characterized in terms of return and risk.  
Return is expressed as either Net Present Value or Net Option Value, the latter being 
appropriate when investments are staged with intervening decision points for continued 
investment.  Confidence (i.e., 1- Risk) is expressed in terms of the probability that Net Value 
exceeds some threshold, in this example zero. 
The characterization of Confidence for each project enables consideration of the 
variability of Return for each investment.  Thus, for example, PD, PG, and PZ are equivalent in 
term of Return.  If Return were the only metric, these potential investments would be equivalent.  
However, once Confidence is added, it is clear that PZ is the superior investment. 
Sources of Uncertainty 
The importance of characterizing the variability of returns requires that we consider 
sources of uncertainty in the shipbuilding enterprise.  Figure 4 provides an initial 
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have significant impacts on uncertainties in terms of both magnitudes and timing of returns.  A 
portfolio management approach requires that we model these sources of uncertainty and use 
this model to derive a probability distribution for savings cash flow and net value to enable 
characterizing Confidence for each potential investment. 
 
Figure 4. Sources of Uncertainty in Ship Building 
Investment Valuation 
When considering whether to invest in any initiative, the inevitable question arises, what 
is the value of that initiative?  For a private-sector initiative, this question, at least in theory, has 
a relatively straightforward answer.  The value of an initiative is the expected present value of 
the future cash flows.  Since private firms seek to maximize their profits, such a single objective 
measure is not unreasonable. 
The public sector is a little more complicated.  Government agencies typically seek to 
balance multiple, competing objectives to maximize the public good.  In an ideal world, one 
could establish a measure of public utility over the set of competing objectives, and the value of 
an initiative would be the utility it is expected to deliver.  Since developing an explicit utility 
function for public good would be a highly political exercise, we will leave determining the public 
good to policy makers.  Thus, we take the tact here that the goals of a government agency such 
as the DoD have been set, and the initiative we are concerned with are those that minimize the 
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Fixing the goals allows us to value monetarily what amount to process change initiatives.  
Given a current process for achieving a set of goals (e.g., the current DoD acquisition process in 
Figure 1), what savings would a process change yield?  The expected present value of the cost 
savings would be the value of this process change.  This transforms the value of a public-sector 
initiative into a series of cash flows and opens the door for us to use investment valuation tools 
developed for private-sector investments. 
Traditional Approach. The traditional measure of the value of an investment is Net 
Present Value (NPV).  NPV is simply future cash flows (positive or negative) discounted to 
present value and summed.  If the NPV is positive, the investment is worth the cost.  In a risk-
free world, NPV would be a perfectly acceptable measure, but when uncertainty is introduced, 
NPV tends to undervalue investments. 
There are two key reasons for undervaluation.  The first is that an NPV valuation 
assumes total commitment to an investment regardless of intermediate results.  If, for example, 
an R&D project is found to be technically infeasible shortly after it is begun, all of the planned 
expenditures will be made despite the new information that has been gained.  Thus, NPV does 
not reflect managerial flexibility to terminate investments, which is of considerable value in 
limiting downside risk. 
If managerial flexibility reduces downside risk, it stands to reason that failing to account 
for it undervalues a project.  One way to compensate for this shortcoming of NPV is to employ a 
decision tree.  A decision tree can be used to account for managerial flexibility, and it produces 
an expected NPV that is a better measure than the traditional, deterministic NPV.  Decision 
trees, however, do not account for the second shortcoming of NPV, which is a little more subtle. 
The question always arises when calculating NPV, what is the appropriate discount 
rate?  Traditionally, the answer is the enterprise’s cost of capital (i.e., the effective interest rate 
at which the enterprise can borrow money) because it reflects the rate of return that investors 
demand from the enterprise given its level of systematic (market) risk.  The problem is that the 
riskiness of any particular investment may not be the same as that of the overall enterprise and 
will change as new information is gained over the course of the project.  Since investors 
demand different rates of returns for different levels of risk, the discount rate will change as the 
project progresses.  In theory, the appropriate discount rates can be derived from a capital asset 
pricing model, but in practice this is rather difficult. 
Real Options. A real-options approach accounts for both managerial flexibility and 
appropriate risk-adjusted discount rates.  A call option is the right, but not the obligation, to buy 
an asset (such as shares of stock) at a pre-specified price over a pre-specified time interval.  
One type of call option, known as the European call option, specifies a particular date on which 
the option can be exercised.  When the date of expiration is reached, if the price of the 
underlying asset is greater than the pre-specified purchase price, the option holder would want 
to exercise the option since the asset is worth more than its price.  If, on the other hand, the 
price of the asset were below the pre-specified price, the option holder would, obviously, not 
want to exercise the option.  Thus, a call option mitigates downside risk since the most that can 
be lost is the purchase price of the call option. 
Now, consider product development.  Assume that there is an initial investment to 
develop the product, and then a subsequent investment required to build a factory to produce 
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business the option to build a factory to produce the new product.  The underlying asset is the 
present value of the free cash flows generated from the sales of the product.  Since market 
conditions change over time, the value of the market for the product will also change.   At the 
end of the development phase, if management felt that it would lose money selling the new 
product, they would certainly not build the factory.  If, on the other hand, the new product 
appears profitable, they will build the factory, i.e., exercise the option that they “bought” with 
their initial investment in product development (Rouse & Boff, 2004). 
Black and Scholes (1973) in their seminal paper developed a closed-form equation that 
determines the fair price of a European call option; and subsequent researchers have 
developed methods to price many other types of options.  The basic premise of their pricing 
scheme is that options draw their value from the behavior of the underlying asset.  For real 
options, the underlying asset is the expected present value of the future cash flows that are 
generated from a successful implementation of an initiative.  These cash flows would be subject 
to a variety of uncertainties, the nature of which depend on the particular domain of interest. 
Now, consider process-oriented initiatives such as transformation of acquisition.  For a 
large project, one would likely divide the project up into several stages to mitigate risk.  As 
indicated in Figure 4, there are several kinds of risks of concern.  We can, at least initially, group 
these uncertainties into two classes: market risk and technical risk.  Market risk is the 
uncertainty in the final outcome of the project.  For a process-change project, the savings 
achieved will be heavily dependent upon the prices or costs of the inputs to the process.  As the 
prices of those inputs fluctuate, so will the value of the project.  If, for example, the prices of 
several major inputs were to fall precipitously, it might make the effort involved to change the 
processes not seem worth it.  Technical risk involves the uncertainty in the execution of the 
project.  Budgets and priorities might shift, the requisite personnel might not be available, or the 
idea behind the process change simply might not work.  Staging a project provides managerial 
flexibility and the ability to limit downside risk. 
Each stage provides project management an option to discontinue the project. So, a 
multistage project could be viewed as a compound call option.  The last stage is a call option on 
the future cash flows, but the stage before would be an option to buy the call option, and so on.  
It turns out that if we make certain assumptions about the variability of the underlying asset, 
there is analytic equation that determines the value of a compound call option (see Geske, 
1979; Cassimon et al., 2004).  Another approach that is more intuitive and flexible is the 
binomial lattice method (Luenberger, 1998; Trigeorgis, 1996). 
Example. To illustrate how the real-options approach could be used to value a process-
improvement project, assume that we are considering revising acquisition procedures for new 
weapon systems such that we reduce the cycle-time for early stage activities such as 
developing requirements and specifications.  These are fairly manpower-intensive tasks, and, 
hence, we would assume that the savings from this procedural change would come as a 
reduction in the number of man-hours required to carry out these tasks.  There are two things 
we need to determine:  What is the value of these savings, and are the savings worth the cost of 
making the change?  To use the real-options approach, we must first characterize the behavior 
of the underlying asset—in this case the present value of future savings. 
For simplicity, let us assume that this is a three-stage initiative.  The first stage involves 
studying the feasibility and implementation of the proposed reform.  The second stage involves 
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implementing the new process DoD-wide.  Each stage has an implementation cost, a probability 
of success, and an expected duration.   We will assume the following notional values for the 
cost, probability of success, and duration of each stage.  We also assume that since the 
government borrows at the risk-free rate, the cost of capital or discount rate is equal to the risk-
free rate. 
Table 1. Project Stage Parameters 
Stage Cost P(Success) Duration (years)
1 1,000,000.00$          0.3 0.5
2 500,000,000.00$      0.5 2
3 3,000,000,000.00$   0.75 N/A  
Note that the duration of the final stage is not relevant for this analysis because we 
assume that the costs and benefits are discounted to the point of decision.  Since no further 
decisions are made after the decision to enact stage three, we are not concerned with the 
stochastic behavior beyond that point. 
Based on a representative set of model parameters, e.g., a savings rate of 2%, we 
obtain a traditional expected net present value of  -$2,236,145,664—an expected loss of over 
$2 billion.  However, this valuation does not account for managerial flexibility.  When we 
evaluate the project as a real option using the binomial lattice method with a time step size of 
0.01 years, we get a value of  $355,852,308.  Thus, the project actually has an expected gain of 
over $350 million.  Of course, these results are for a particular rate of cost savings, i.e., 2%.  As 
we vary the value of this parameter, we see in Figure 5 that the net option value (NOV) is 
always greater than the expected net present value (NPV). 
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Net Option Value (NOV) vs. Net Present Value (NPV)

























We see that for savings rates under about 1%, we would reject this project if we used 
NOV as our decision criterion.  However, if we used NPV as the criterion, we would reject this 
project even for savings rates greater than 5%. 
What about the uncertainties in the project outcome?  It is a well-known property of 
options that they actually increase in value when the uncertainty increases.  This is because 
managerial flexibility reduces downside risk while preserving upside potential.  This is especially 
true for “borderline” projects.  Figure 6 depicts the change in net option value as the log volatility 
of price-per-man-hour changes when the savings rate is set to 1%.  Log-volatility is a measure 
of the uncertainty or noisiness of the price.  We see that as it increases the value of the option 
increases. 
This trend applies to technical risk as well as market risk.  The real options methodology 
is consistent with the intuitive notion that one can undertake highly risky projects if one stages 
them to limit downside risk.  This allows for justification of worthwhile projects that would have 
been rejected under a more traditional NPV analysis. 
Often, one may have many such projects under consideration.  If we assume that the 
projects are fairly independent, we would like to examine the risk-reward trade off of our 
portfolio.  In theory, risk has been fully accounted for in the net-option value, and any other 
examination of risk would be a form of double counting.  But the problem is that the option value 
calculation presumes risk neutrality on behalf of the decision makers with regard to any non-
systematic (non-diversifiable) risk. The rationale behind this is that the shareholders of a firm 
also hold shares of many other firms, and they can diversify away any risks that are not intrinsic 
to the marketplace.  If the managers of a firm truly serve the shareholders of a firm, then they 
should be risk-neutral with regard to any non-systematic risks (e.g., the failure of the project). 
Of course, we know in reality that this is not really true.  A manager’s job may depend 
upon the success or failure of a project, and there may be shareholders who do not hold fully 
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least somewhat risk-averse.  While risk neutrality is a convenient assumption for valuation 
purposes, it would be meaningful to a risk-averse decision maker to see some measure of the 
uncertainty in a project’s outcome. 
Figure 6. Sensitivity of NOV to Volatility in Price per Man-hour 
Net Option Value versus Price Volatility





















There are several possible measures of risk with variance being the most common in a 
financial setting.  In this case, however, we have used staging to mitigate much of the downside 
risk while preserving the upside risk.  Since variance does not distinguish between the two, high 
variance in this case may actually be good.  Nevertheless, most decision makers would like to 
know about the downside risks of a project.  One possible measure of the downside risk of a 
project is the conditional expected value of a loss.  That is, if the project does experience a loss, 
how big of a loss can be expected?  Such a quantity can be somewhat cumbersome to 
determine with complicated projects, so Monte Carlo simulation was used to determine the 
conditional expected loss for the previous example. 
For the example project, the conditional expected loss was found to be approximately 
$330 million.  That means that if there were a loss, on average it would be $330 million.  
Considering that the total implementation costs for the project are about $3.5 billion, we can see 
the power of staging as a risk-mitigating factor.  If we had a portfolio of many such projects, we 
could plot their net option values versus their conditional expected losses to better understand 
the balance between risk and reward.  The result would be a portfolio plot such as Figure 3—in 
this case using risk rather than confidence. 
 
ENTERPRISE TRANSFORMATION 
Enterprise transformation is driven by experienced and/or expected value deficiencies 
and is enabled by changes of work processes (Rouse, 2005a, 2005b, 2006).  By “work,” we 




= - 125 - 
=
=
affected in organizational processes for policy, authorization, appropriation, acquisition, 
development and deployment, or of technical processes for design, production, operations, 
maintenance, and repair.  Work processes may be changed to increase returns and/or decrease 
risks. 
In general, the type of changes just outlined will impact time, costs, and uncertainties.  
These impacts will, in turn, affect the timing and magnitude of expected cash flows and, hence, 
the NPV, NOV and Confidence associated with potential investments.  A typical result, as 
shown in Figure 7, is that transformation affects the attractiveness of the potential investments 
depicted on the portfolio plot.  In this example, the set of non-dominated alternatives has 
changed due to transformation initiatives that, in this instance, have somewhat increased return 

















Thus, employing the methodology described in this paper, one can assess the economic 
value of alternative transformation initiatives.  This is particularly important in the public sector 
where, in our experience, there is an abundance of transformation initiatives.  Most of these 
initiatives make sense.  However, it is difficult to choose those few initiatives deserving of major 
investment without some means of assessing the relative value of alternative initiatives.  The 
methodology presented here provides such a means. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The acquisition of public-sector complex systems is time consuming, very expensive, 
and rife with uncertainties.  Consequently, the enterprise associated with acquisition is an 
excellent candidate for transformation—fundamental changes of organizational processes for 
policy, authorization, appropriation, acquisition, development and deployment, or of technical 
processes for design, production, operations, maintenance, and repair.  This paper has argued 
for an enterprise-wide perspective when choosing among alternative transformation initiatives. 
We have also argued for economic valuation of the alternative transformation 
investments and presented an options-based methodology for such economic assessments.  A 
notional example was used to illustrate the impact of this approach versus a more traditional 
approach.  In general, traditional discounted cash flow methods very much under-value multi-
stage initiatives.  Options-based approaches, in contrast, enable many more early-stage 
investments but fewer later-stage investments, thereby not diluting resources to invest in high-
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